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11 Introduction
One of the most salient features of the business cycle, as argued by Lucas (1977), is the per-
sistent and positive comovements in aggregate economic activities, such as consumption, hours,
productivity, investment, and output over the business cycle. The real business cycle (RBC) the-
ory introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) has so far accounted
for such comovements by relying heavily on technology shocks. Demand shocks have not played a
major role in RBC models. The heavy reliance of standard RBC models on technology shocks to
explain the business cycle, however, has been met by much criticism (see, for example, Blanchard
1989 and 1993, Cochrane 1994, Evans 1992, Gordon 1993, Mankiw 1989 and Summers 1986). More
recently, Gali (1999, 2004) and Gali and Rabanal (2004) point out that the U.S. and European
employment and productivity data are inconsistent with the implications of a standard RBC model
driven by technology shocks.1
Economic activities are also highly synchronized across countries. Productivity, output, em-
ployment, consumption, and investment, for example, are positively correlated between the U.S.
and Europe. But Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) show that standard general equilibrium
models driven by technology shocks cannot explain such international comovements. Under free
trade, standard models predict high activity in high-productivity countries and low activity in
low-productivity countries, suggesting negative cross-country correlations for economic activities
under country-speci￿c technology shocks. Although introducing market frictions that inhibit free
trade can mitigate the problems, some of the puzzles are highly robust to model modi￿cations. For
example, one of the most robust puzzles is that the predicted cross-country correlations are higher
for consumption and productivity than for output, while the opposite is true in the data.2
This paper provides a plausible alternative to resolve the international business cycle puzzles
without resorting to market frictions. It shows that the observed international synchronization
in economic activities can be rationalized by standard general equilibrium theory once aggregate
demand (in particular, consumption demand) is allowed to be the primary source of aggregate
￿ uctuations. The standard two-country general equilibrium model of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1992), for example, can predict both within-country and cross-country business cycle comovements
when the main source of uncertainty is from consumption demand. In particular, the model can
1Based on this, they call into question the relevance of RBC theory for understanding economic ￿ uctuations. This
paper shows such a conclusion to be premature. On the other hand, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2001) also argue
that Gali￿ s ￿ndings are not robust.
2Many counter-factual predictions of the general equilibrium theory under technology shocks tend to be quite
robust to model modi￿cations. A vast literature has developed to address the issue. See, for example, Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1995), Baxter and Crucini (1995), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Kehoe and Perri (2002),
Kollmann (2001), Baxter and Farr (2005), and Pakko (1997, 2003), to name just a few. For additional literature, also
see Obtsfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2001), Heathcote and Perri (2002), and Xiao (2004),
among others.
2predict that: 1) national output, investment, productivity, and hours are positively correlated with
their counterparts in other countries, and the cross-country correlations are stronger for output
than for consumption and productivity (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992 and 1995); 2) national
saving rates and national investment rates are strongly positively correlated within each country
(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980); and 3) the net-exports-to-output ratio is less volatile than output
and is negatively correlated with output (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992). Besides being able to
predict the positive comovements of economic activities across nations, the model can also explain
many key features of the domestic business cycle comovements which are thought explainable only
by technology shocks, such as: 1) domestic productivity, employment, consumption, and investment
are positively correlated with output over the business cycle (Kydland and Prescott, 1982); and 2)
changes in output are more volatile than changes in consumption, but less volatile than changes in
investment (Kydland and Prescott, 1982).3
The intuition for consumption demand shocks being capable of explaining international business
cycle comovements is simple. Consider a standard two-country, one-sector stochastic growth model
driven by exogenous shocks to the marginal utility of consumption. An increase in consumption
demand in the home country raises aggregate demand for goods in the world, causing a ￿spillover￿
demand e⁄ect on other countries. Production and employment therefore increase both at home
and abroad, resulting in their positive comovement across borders. Investment in both countries
must also increase if the change in consumption demand is persistent, leading to increases in pro-
duction capacities both at home and abroad so as to meet the anticipated rise in world demand.
Since preference shocks are likely to be country-speci￿c, consumption expenditures are less synchro-
nized across countries than production. Consequently, standard general equilibrium theory predicts
higher cross-country correlations for output than for consumption, as well as positive cross-country
correlations for both employment and investment. Since the ￿ uctuations are demand-driven, not
technology-driven, there is little incentive for countries to shift capital across borders to meet the
increased world demand (even under the assumption of perfect capital mobility) when a higher de-
mand for output in one country also raises the demand for output in other countries. Consequently,
national saving rates rise mainly due to the increases in national investment rates, not to changes
in net exports. Hence predicted national savings and national investment are positively correlated
even if capital is perfectly mobile across borders, giving rise to the apparent ￿home-bias puzzle￿in
international capital allocation (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). Furthermore, if there are employ-
ment adjustment costs to induce labor hoarding behavior, productivity will also be procyclical and
highly correlated across countries under country-speci￿c demand shocks. Thus the observed posi-
3There is a literature arguing that demand shocks combined with market failures such as externalities are re-
sponsible for economic ￿ uctuations. See, for example, Benhabib and Wen (2004), Farmer (1999), Wen (1998), Weder
(2001), and Xiao (2004). However, I show in this paper that market failures such as externalities are not preconditions
for explaining domestic and international comovements, although they may exacerbate the e⁄ects of demand shocks.
3tive cross-country comovements in productivity can also be rationalized by demand shocks alone ￿
without resorting to technology shocks or increasing returns to scale.
The importance of consumption demand shocks in helping resolve business cycle puzzles has
been emphasized in the literature by a number of people. Important works include Baxter and
King (1991), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Hall (1997), and Wen (2004), among others. Baxter
and King (1991) show that preference shocks that create urges to consume can explain closed-
economy business cycles almost as well as technology shocks provided that there are high enough
increasing returns to scale in the economy due to externalities. Stockman and Tesar (1995) show
that taste shocks in conjunction with technology shocks can help resolve some of the international
comovement puzzles. However, since technology shocks play a major role in their analysis while
taste shocks play only a minor one, Stockmand and Tesar do not resolve the puzzle of cross-
country correlations being signi￿cantly higher for output than for consumption. Hall (1997) argues
that in order to explain the labor market dynamics, preference shocks must dominate technology
shocks in a standard closed-economy RBC model. Wen (2004) shows that preference shocks alone,
without increasing returns to scale, are able to generate procyclical labor productivity under labor
hoarding and variable capacity utilization. Wen (2004), however, does not address the international
comovement puzzles. The novel contribution of this paper is to show that if preference shocks to
consumption demand are given a dominant role, then many international business cycle puzzles can
be resolved qualitatively even without market frictions, such as externalities, increasing returns to
scale, imperfect competition, incomplete ￿nancial markets, imperfect risk sharing, sticky prices, and
so on. These frictions may exacerbate the e⁄ects of demand shocks, but they are not preconditions
for demand shocks to explain the qualitative features of the business cycle.
The ￿nding that procyclical productivity in a country can be explained by either domestic
demand shocks or foreign demand shocks (via net exports) helps in understanding and predicting
the strong revival of the Japanese economy in recent years due to the strong export demand from
China. This view of the procyclical productivity is consistent with traditional Keynesian theory,
yet without needing to assume sticky prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A simple benchmark model is studied in Section
2 to gain intuition. A more general model is studied in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
paper with remarks for further research.
2 The Basic Model
This is a simpli￿ed version of the two-country model studied by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1992). The theoretical world economy consists of two identical countries, each represented by a
large number of identical consumers and an identical production technology. The countries produce
4the same good and have the same preferences. The labor input in each country consists only of
domestic labor, and consumption is subject to country-speci￿c shocks.























; for j = h;f; (1)
where c is consumption of the produced good, n is labor supply, and ￿ represents a country-speci￿c
random shock to the marginal utility of consumption. Production of the single good takes place in













; for j = h;f: (2)
World output from the two processes, yh
t + y
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By exploiting the equivalence between competitive equilibria and Pareto optima, an equilibrium































































t ￿ 1; (6)
and K0 > 0 given for j = h;f; where K denotes the world capital stock, and ￿j 2 [0;1] denotes the
fraction of the world capital stock allocated to production in country j. Without loss of generality,
an equal weight is assumed in the objective function.





























































+ (1 ￿ ￿)
3
5; (10)
where f￿;￿g are Lagrange multipliers associated with the world-wide resource constraints (5) and
(6), respectively. The resource constraints support international risk sharing via three channels of
cross-country transfers: transfer of consumption goods, transfer of investment goods, and transfer
of ￿xed assets (i.e., factors of production). Equation (7) shows that the (expected) marginal utilities
of current consumption are equalized across countries due to the transfer of consumption goods.
Equation (8) is the labor-market equilibrium condition for each country. Equation (9) shows that
the marginal products of capital are equalized across countries due to the transfer of ￿xed assets
(capital mobility). Equation (10) equates the marginal cost of current savings to the expected
marginal returns to investment in the world capital market due to the transfer of investment goods.
Due to the international transfers of capital and investment goods, capital used in production in a
speci￿c country is not necessarily owned by residents of that country; thus, gross investment in a
speci￿c country (j) can be de￿ned as
i
j
t = ￿jKt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿jKt + (￿
j
t ￿ ￿j)Kt
= ￿jIt + (￿
j
t ￿ ￿j)Kt;
where It denotes aggregate world investment, and ￿j (= 0:5) denotes the fraction of the world
population residing in country j, which is also the steady state value for ￿
j
t. The last term in the
above expression for national investment, (￿
j
t ￿￿j)Kt, indicates the size of foreign capital operating
in country j during period t, and is called foreign direct investment.4 Foreign direct investment
for country j is positive if ￿j > ￿j and negative if ￿j < ￿j. Consequently, gross investment in a
speci￿c country consists of net increases in both home-owned capital stock (￿jIt) and foreign direct









To understand why consumption demand shocks can help resolve the international comove-
ment puzzles, I ￿rst illustrate how these puzzles can arise under technology shocks in the ￿rst
place. Consider (country-speci￿c) technology shocks (Aj) in the production functions: y
j
t =
4Note that although the next-period world capital stock (Kt+1) is known at time t; the next-period capital stock




t+1Kt+1; cannot be determined in time period t because ￿
j
t+1 is not determined


























































where ￿t denotes the home-country￿ s share of the world capital stock. These ￿rst-order conditions








































These cross-country ratios indicate a perfect cross-country correlation for consumption and imper-
fect cross-country correlations for other variables such as output, investment, and labor (due to
the assumption that technology shocks are country speci￿c). In particular, since the world capital
share ￿t is completely dictated by technology ratios across countries, the predicted cross-country
correlations for output, investment, and labor are all negative under country speci￿c technology
shocks.5
Consider a positive technology shock in the home country. Consumption increases both at
home and abroad because of an international income e⁄ect supported by the channel of transfer
5The cross-country ratios indicate that the volatilities of the model are very sensitive to the inverse labor supply
elasticity parameter ￿. As ￿ approaches zero, for example, even a very small technology shock can generate extremely
volatile movements in output and labor due to factor mobility across countries. The volatility of factor mobility can
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;
where circum￿ ex variables denote percentage changes around the steady state. Assuming that country speci￿c
technology shocks have identical variances (￿
2







For example, let the steady-state value of the world capital share ￿ = 0:5, and let ￿ = 0:25 and ￿ = 0:3: We then
have ￿￿ ￿ 5￿A: It is also clear that ￿￿ approaches in￿nity as ￿ approaches zero.
7of consumption goods. Employment increases at home and decreases abroad for two reasons. The
￿rst is an international substitution e⁄ect of leisure supported by risk sharing, which causes the
high-productivity country to decrease leisure and the low-productivity country to increase leisure.
This substitution e⁄ect exists regardless of capital mobility, as long as countries can trade in
currently produced goods. The second reason is capital mobility, which permits existing capital to
￿ ow to the highest returns, thus increasing labor demand at home and decreasing labor demand
abroad. Consequently, cross-country correlations for employment (as well as output) are negative.
Investment increases at home and decreases in the foreign country also for two reasons. First, the
ability to transfer investment goods across national borders induces national savings to ￿ ow to the
highest expected returns. Second, capital mobility implies that the foreign direct investment is
positive in the home country and negative in the foreign country (capital drain). Hence, general
equilibrium theory predicts that cross-country correlations for output, employment, and investment
are all negative under technology shocks unless these shocks are highly positively correlated across
countries.
Thus puzzles arise: the predicted cross-country correlations are much higher for consumption
than for output, while in the data the opposite is true; and the predicted cross-country correlations
of employment and investment are negative, while in the data they are positive. Furthermore, the
predicted volatilities for both investment and net exports relative to output are excessively large
compared to the observed values.
There has been no shortage of explanations in the literature for these puzzles, with most of them
focusing on market frictions and market incompleteness that inhibit international risk sharing. The
problem is that some of these puzzles, especially the cross-country consumption correlations puzzle,
are so robust to model modi￿cations that none of the explanations advanced in the literature to
date can completely resolve these puzzles at once (see footnote 2 for the literature).
However, the counter-factual predictions of the basic model are completely turned around if the
primary source of shocks causing short-run economic ￿ uctuations in international trade comes from
the demand side (e.g., consumption) rather than from the supply side (e.g., technology). Under


























8The last equation implies that the optimal foreign direct investment (capital mobility) is zero (i.e., ￿t






= 1: These cross-country ratios imply that output, investment,
and labor are perfectly synchronized across countries while consumption is imperfectly correlated
across countries (due to country-speci￿c demand shocks). Thus, unless consumption shocks are
perfectly correlated across countries, the predicted cross-country correlations are higher for output
than for consumption (as observed in the data); and the predicted cross-country correlations for
employment and investment are positive (as observed in the data).
The intuition is simple. It is a typical Keynesian story of aggregate demand. Consider an
increase in consumption demand in the home country due to a high urgency to consume. This
raises demand for both domestic output and foreign output under international risk sharing. Hence
production increases both at home and abroad in response to the higher world demand. In the mean
time, investment may also rise both at home and abroad if the increase in demand is persistent,
so that each country can build up more production capacities to sustain the persistent increases in
the world demand. The higher investment demand across countries reinforces the initial rise in the
world demand. Consequently, we observe strong comovements (positive correlations) in output,
investment, and employment across countries. If the urge to consume (demand shock) is country-
speci￿c, consumption will be less correlated across countries than output.7 Furthermore, since
capital does not ￿ ow across borders, national savings rise mainly due to the increases in domestic
investment demand, hence the predicted domestic saving-investment correlations are positive, as
they are in the data.8 In addition, given that ￿t does not respond to ￿t, the predicted volatilities of
investment and net exports are substantially lower than they are under technology shocks,9 which
resolves the extremely large export-volatility and investment-volatility puzzles identi￿ed by BKK
(1992), without resorting to restrictions on capital mobility.
Notice that the results are not driven by the simplifying assumption of separability in the utility
6The intuition for ￿t being constant under demand shocks is that domestic investment possibilities o⁄er a suf-
￿cient scope for self-insurance through intertemporal domestic reallocations when the two countries have identical
technologies. Hence positive foreign direct investment is not optimal unless there are technology shocks which create
di⁄erentials in returns to capital across countries.
7Risk sharing maximizes the cross-country correlations for (ct ￿ ￿t); not for ct.
8Under symmetric consumption demand shocks across countries, net exports of newly produced goods can be




























It is clear then that the saving-investment correlation is not only positive but also close to one since the volatility of
net exports is small relative to that of investment under persistent consumption shocks.
9When ￿t is constant, the volatility of investment for each country becomes the same as that of aggregate world
investment.
9function. What is crucial is that the preference shocks must truly represent shocks to consumption




(ct ￿ ￿t)￿(1 ￿ nt)1￿￿￿1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
;
where ￿ is a standard way to model preference shocks and ￿ is the way adopted in this paper to
represent shocks to the urge to consume. ￿ a⁄ects the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure
in the same direction, while ￿ a⁄ects them in the opposite direction. In a competitive equilibrium,









where w is the real wage taken as given by the agent. Clearly, ￿ dose not a⁄ect the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure, but ￿ does. This has important implications for
the cross-country division of work. A positive ￿-shock to the home country raises the marginal
utility of both consumption and leisure at home relative to that of the foreign country, causing a
decrease in labor supply at home and an increase in labor supply abroad due to international risk
sharing. This leads to negative cross-country comovements in economic activities. On the other
hand, although a positive ￿-shock increases the marginal utility of consumption at home, it also
leads to an increase in hours worked. To see this, note that the increase in consumption is always
smaller than the increase in ￿, otherwise the original consumption allocation before the shock would
not have been optimal. Hence the term c ￿ ￿ decreases after the shock. According to the above
equation, this implies that labor supply (n) at home will also increase so as to raise labor income to
￿nance the higher consumption demand without crowding out savings. With trade, this also raises
the net-exports demand in the foreign country, causing production to increase abroad. Hence ￿
is a better representation for consumption demand shocks than ￿ in a traditional Keynesian sense
when the utility function is nonseparable. If the utility function is separable, however, then it does
not matter whether ￿ a⁄ects the utility of consumption multiplicatively or additively, since the
marginal utility of leisure is independent of ￿.
Table 1 reports cross-country correlations of output, consumption, investment, and employ-
ment predicted by the model when the utility parameter ￿ takes di⁄erent values. The rest of the
parameters are calibrated as follows: ￿ = 0:99;￿ = 0:3;￿ = 0:025;￿ = 0:34, and the steady state
ratio, ￿
c = 0:1.10 The persistence of the consumption shocks is assumed to be 0:9 in an AR(1)
speci￿cation. It shows that country-speci￿c consumption demand shocks always generate positive
10This ratio a⁄ects only the absolute volatility of the model, but has no e⁄ect on either the relative volatilities or
the dynamics of the model. Hence it￿ s calibration can be arbitrary.
10cross-country correlations for economic activities in output, investment, and labor.11 Hence, it
does not matter whether the utility is separable or not between consumption and leisure. What is
crucial is how the shocks enter the utility function.
Table 1. Sensitivity to Non-Separable Utility
￿ corr(yh;yf) corr(ih;if) corr(nh;nf)
3 1:0 0:99 1:0
2 1:0 0:99 1:0
1 1:0 0:99 1:0
0 0:97 0:53 0:97
Thus, general equilibrium theory predicts that when urges to consume arise in a speci￿c country,
international trade (risk sharing) causes a world-wide production synchronization, which gives rise
to the apparently puzzling phenomenon that ￿[w]hen an economic boom produces high output,
employment, and investment in the United States, there is usually a simultaneous boom in other
industrialized countries￿ (Baxter and Farr, 2005). This phenomenon is puzzling, however, only
if we assume that international business cycles are driven primarily by technological di⁄erentials
across countries. With consumption demand shocks as the main driving force of business cycles,
the aforementioned phenomenon is expected and the international comovement ￿puzzle￿disappears
(at least in a qualitative sense).
3 The General Model
The basic model serves to demonstrate that consumption shocks can provide an alternative and
e⁄ective way of resolving international comovement puzzles without resorting to extreme forms of
market frictions. But the basic model has several shortcomings with respect to domestic comove-
ments. First, labor productivity is countercyclical under consumption shocks in the basic model.
To solve this problem, I follow the traditional literature by introducing factor hoarding ￿variable
capital and labor utilization ￿into the basic model. Second, consumption is too volatile relative
to output and investment under consumption shocks. To solve this problem, habit formation is
introduced. The general model builds on the closed-economy model of Burnside and Eichenbaum
(1996), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) and Wen (2004, 2005).12
11The predicted cross-country correlation for consumption is close to zero but slightly negative. A little bit of
positive cross-country correlation in the shocks can lead to positively correlated consumptions.
12For the recent literature on factor hoarding and procyclical productivity, see Basu (1996), Bernanke and Parkinson
(1991), Dornbusch and Fischer (1981), Rotemberg and Summers (1990), and Shapiro (1993), among others. Habit
formation has a long history in the study of consumption dynamics (see Deaton, 1992, for an overview). It has
been used by Constantinides (1990), Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher
(2001), Wen (1998), and many others to explain asset markets dynamics and the business cycle. Wen (1998) also
studies habit formation on leisure. Habit formation, however, can induce extremely smooth consumption and possibly
countercyclical employment under technology shocks, as is shown recently by Lettau and Uhlig (2000). This problem,
however, does not arise under preference shocks.
11For simplicity, I continue to assume separability in preferences13 and symmetry in technologies




























































































t ￿ 1; (22)
and K0 > 0 given for j = h;f; where b 2 [0;1) measures the degree of habit, T denotes time
endowment in each period, ￿ is the cost of time from going to work, ￿ is the length of working hours
per shift, and et is the e⁄ort level. Following Burnside et al. (1993), labor supply is indivisible (e.g.,
Hansen, 1985; and Rogerson, 1988). Since the size of the labor force in each country is normalized
to one, nt represents the employment rate.14 The parameter   measures the size of dynamic
adjustment costs associated with changing employment relative to its previous level. Adjustment
costs in employment give rise to an incentive for hoarding labor.15 Kt in the adjustment cost term is
a way to normalize the size of the adjustment costs in the steady state so that the parameter   can
be calibrated more easily from data (see, e.g., Wen 2004); it has no e⁄ects on dynamic implications
of the model near the steady state since it drops out from the model under a ￿rst-order Taylor
expansion. Although adjusting employment stock is costly in the model, the e⁄ort level e (the
utilization rate of labor) and the utilization rate of capital (u) can be adjusted instantaneously,
re￿ ecting the idea of factor hoarding (Burnside et al. 1993 and Burnside and Eichenbaum 1996).






t ; ￿ > 1;
13Hence the consumption shocks can be introduced in a multiplicative way, so as to avoid calibrating the steady-
state ratio of
￿
c in the model.
14By assuming indivisible labor, this model does not have variable hours to work. The e⁄ort level, however, can
be interpreted as a fraction of hours to work. The e⁄ective labor input in period t is etnt. Under indivisible labor
the utility function on leisure becomes linear. Thus, the marginal utility of leisure is constant and the labor supply
curve is ￿ at (in￿nitely elastic) and is hence not a⁄ected by preference shocks. Given a ￿ at labor supply curve,
equilibrium employment is determined solely by labor demand. Consequently, a preference shock has no direct e⁄ect
on labor supply and it a⁄ects equilibrium employment only through in￿ uence on labor demand via changing the
shadow price of goods (marginal utility of consumption). Hence, the indivisible labor speci￿cation helps legitimize
the interpretation of preference shocks as genuine demand shocks.
15Wen (2004) shows that labor productivity is counter-cyclical in the model of Burnside at al. (1993) unless
dynamic labor adjustment costs are allowed.
12re￿ ecting convex costs associated with the capital utilization rate (see Greenwood et al. 1988). Kt
continues to denote the world capital stock and ￿
j
t 2 [0;1] the fraction of the world capital stock
allocated to production in country j.
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for j = h;f:
It is worth noting that variable capital and labor utilization do not change the fact that the
production technology has constant returns to scale. To see this, consider a simpler situation where
the dynamic adjustment cost of employment is zero (  = 0). Then the ￿rst-order conditions with
respect to e⁄ort (25) and employment (24) imply that if employment (n) is chosen contempora-
neously with e⁄ort (e), then the optimal level of e⁄ort (e) in each country is a constant and is
determined by the equation, logT ￿ log(T ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿et) =
￿et
T￿￿￿￿et: Hence the output elasticity with
respect to labor is always (1 ￿ ￿), not 2(1 ￿ ￿). Since a positive   implies additional costs on
changing employment, it does not enhance returns to scale in the model. With respect to capital
utilization, it can be shown that the ￿rst order condition for the optimal utilization rate in each







￿ ; where y denotes output, which can be used to
substitute out u in the original production function to obtain a reduced-form production function







t ; where ht ￿ etnt is the e⁄ective labor
service, and A is a constant. Clearly ￿
￿￿1
￿￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿￿ = 1. Hence, variable capital utilization
does not enhance returns to scale either; it simply enhances the output elasticity of labor service
by reducing the output elasticity of capital (since
￿
￿￿￿ > 1 and
￿￿1
￿￿￿ < 1).16 Therefore, procyclical
labor productivity in this model, if it arises, is completely due to labor hoarding and capacity
utilization, not due to increasing returns or technology shocks.
Calibration. The time period is a quarter. I follow Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) by setting
T = 1;369 per quarter, ￿ = 60; and ￿ = 324:8 (implying a steady-state e⁄ort level ￿ e = 1). I
also set the discounting factor ￿ = 0:99; the capital￿ s elasticity ￿ = 0:3, the steady-state quarterly
rate of capital depreciation ￿ ￿ = 0:025 (implying a 10 percent rate of depreciation per year and
￿ ￿ 1:4), and the steady-state employment rate ￿ n = 0:94 (implying an unemployment rate of 6
percent). These parameter values imply a steady-state capital-output ratio of 8:5 (in a quarter or
2:1 in a year) and a steady-state saving rate of 0:2. Based on Shapiro￿ s (1986) estimates on the
size of the adjustment costs of labor, Wen (2004) shows that   = 0:5 is roughly consistent with the
U.S. data, implying a cost of approximately 0:1 percent of GDP. The habit-formation parameter
b has been estimated by many people in the empirical literature and the results change depending
on the instrumental variables used and whether monthly or quarterly data are used. According
to Ferson and Constantinides (1991), the best point estimates of b using quarterly U.S. data lie
between 0:95 and 0:97 with standard errors of 0:05 and 0:01 respectively. Using quarterly data from
other industrial countries, Braun, Constantinides, and Ferson (1993) ￿nd point estimates of b of
0:82 (U.K.), 0:69 (France), 0:93 (Canada), 0:63 (Germany), and 0:64 (Japan), with relatively large
standard errors. They also ￿nd that the log unity function is not rejected by most of these countries.
More recently, Smets and Wouters (2003) give point estimates of b around 0:6 for European data.
Hence, I will initially choose b = 0:8 as a benchmark for habit persistence, and then examine the
robustness of my results against di⁄erent values of b.
In order to make sure that the results are not driven by the assumption of capital mobility in the
general model, a transportation cost for shipping capital across boarders is also introduced. The
literature has shown that restricting international capital mobility either by transportation costs
(Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2000) or by capital adjustment costs (Pakko, 2003) can help resolve some
of the counter-factual predictions of technology shocks. Although it is shown here that replacing
technology shocks by consumption demand shocks can resolve the international comovement puzzles
without introducing frictions to hinder capital movement, it is better still that the resolution o⁄ered
by demand shocks can withstand such frictions. To allow for the possibility of capital immobility in
16See Wen (1998) for more discussions on the dynamic e⁄ects of capital utilization.
14the model, assume there exist transport costs associated with shipping ￿xed capital across borders.





which implies that the marginal transport cost is proportional to the size of foreign direct invest-
ment.17 The parameter ￿ thus determines the degree of capital mobility.
Since consumption shocks and technology shocks give exactly opposite predictions for the cross-
country correlations, and since the data lie somewhere in between quantitatively, it is therefore in-
teresting to evaluate the relative importance of the two types of shocks in the model for explaining
the data. For this purpose, I also add country-speci￿c independent technology shocks into the model
so as to see what magnitude of technology shocks is needed in the model in order to bring the pre-
dicted cross-country correlations into closer conformity with the data quantitatively. Country spe-
ci￿c technology shocks are introduced via the production technology: yt = At(ut￿tKt)￿(etnt)1￿￿.
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where innovations in technology and preference shocks are assumed to be independent, corr("A;"￿) =
0. The correlation between technology shocks, corr("h
A;"
f
A), is estimated by Baxter and Farr (2005)




￿g. In this paper, I assume symmetry across countries and calibrate the variance
of the demand innovations such that the model generates an output volatility exactly the same as






A).18 The standard deviation
of the technology innovation, ￿"A, is a free parameter to be chosen such that the model can best
match the data with respect to cross-country comovements, given the variances and covariances of
consumption shocks. Then I can compute the ratio of the variances of output with and without the
technology shocks. This provides an informal measure of the relative importance of consumption
shocks for explaining output volatility.
17An alternative restriction is that ￿t must be determined one period in advance. Under this restriction, ￿t cannot
respond to shocks in time period t but ￿t+1 will respond if the shocks are expected to be persistent. The results are
similar.
18None of the predicted cross-country correlations of the model depends on the choice of this value, except the
correlation of consumption.
15Table 2. Predicted Moments (standard errors in parentheses)￿
Data Model (￿2
A = 0) Model (￿2
A > 0) Model (￿ = :35)
International
￿(yh;yf) 0.81a ￿ 0.51b 1.00 (0.0) 0.99 (0.0) 0.59 (0.2)
￿(ch;cf) 0.67a ￿ 0.32b 0.04 (0.3) 0.05 (0.3) 0.05 (0.3)
￿(ih;if) 0.73a ￿ 0.29b 1.00 (0.0) 0.35 (0.2) 0.35 (0.2)
￿(nh;nf) 0.75a ￿ 0.43b 1.00 (0.0) 0.99 (0.0) 0.63 (0.2)
￿(y=n;y=n) 0.56e ￿ 0.16f 1.00 (0.0) 0.99 (0.0) 0.52 (0.1)
Domestic
￿(c;y) 0.87b ￿ 0.81a 0.70 (0.1) 0.71 (0.1) 0.63 (0.2)
￿(i;y) 0.93b ￿ 0.81a 0.95 (0.0) 0.80 (0.1) 0.95 (0.0)
￿(n;y) 0.86b ￿ 0.78a 0.86 (0.0) 0.86 (0.0) 0.84 (0.1)
￿(y=n;y) 0.87a ￿ 0.68f 0.58 (0.1) 0.58 (0.1) 0.63 (0.1)
￿(s;i) 0.94c ￿ 0.68d 0.77 (0.1) 0.68 (0.1) 0.87 (0.1)
￿(nx=y;y) -0.36b ￿ -0.66d -0.92 (0.0) -0.88 (0.1) -0.94 (0.0)
Volatility
￿y(%) 1.69a ￿ 1.71d 1.69 (0.0) 1.70 (0.0) 1.95 (0.0)
~ ￿y(%) n/a 1.69 (0.0) 1.69 (0.0) 1.69 (0.0)
￿c=￿y 0.76a ￿ 0.79b 0.88 (0.2) 0.88 (0.1) 0.76 (0.1)
￿i=￿y 2.98a ￿ 3.27e 2.91 (0.1) 3.56 (0.5) 3.21 (0.2)
￿n=￿y 0.85a ￿ 0.63b 0.81 (0.1) 0.81 (0.1) 0.78 (0.1)
￿y=n=￿y 0.59a 0.51 (0.1) 0.52 (0.1) 0.54 (0.1)
￿nx=y=￿y 0.25a ￿ 0.86a 0.46 (0.1) 0.59 (0.2) 0.38 (0.1)
Persistence
￿(yt;yt￿1) 0.89a ￿ 0.85d 0.81 (0.1) 0.81 (0.1) 0.77 (0.1)
￿
Note: The predicted statistics are based on 500 simulations with sample length of 100. All series are H-P ￿ltered. Data source: a: Baxter
and Farr (2001); b: Kehoe and Perri (2002); c: Feldstein and Horioka (1980); d: BKK (1992); e: BKK (1995); f: Ambler et al. (2004).
Table 2 reports the predicted moments of the model along with the estimated data moments
(in the second column) reported by the existing literature.19 The third column reports the pre-
dictions of the model with consumption shocks only (i.e., ￿A = 0), where the standard deviations
of consumption shocks are chosen such that the predicted output volatility (￿y) matches the data.
This gives ￿￿ = 0:025.20 The predicted moments con￿rm the previous analysis in Section 2 that
19In Table 2, ￿y represents the standard deviation of output and ~ ￿y represents the standard deviation of output in
the absence of technology shocks. The estimated data moments reported by the existing literature vary quite a lot
depending on the particular countries and sample periods selected as well as on the speci￿c de￿nitions of variables
adopted. For example, the estimated cross-country correlations for output range from 0:81 (reported by Baxter and
Farr, 2001) to 0:51 (reported by Kehoe and Perri, 2000) or even much lower (reported by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland,
1992), and the reported cross-country correlations for consumption range from 0:67 (reported by Baxter and Farr,
2001) to 0:32 (reported by Kehoe and Perri, 2000) or even negative (reported by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992).
What remain as robust features of the data, therefore, are not the quantitative but qualitative characteristics; namely,
the cross country correlations are positive and signi￿cantly higher for output than for consumption, and they are
positive for hours and investment. Similar caveats apply to statistics characterizing domestic business cycles.
20This number can be reduced substantially if the consumption shocks enter the utility additively: u(c;￿) =
log(c ￿ ￿); provided that the steady-state ratio,
￿
c 2 [0;1]; is not too small. This ratio will not a⁄ect the relative
volatilities of the model variables, nor the dynamics of the model.
16consumption shocks can qualitatively explain the positive international comovements. The fourth
column reports the predicted moments when technology shocks are added into the model. The stan-
dard deviation of technology shocks is increased until the point beyond which the cross-country
correlation for investment becomes insigni￿cant or negative. This gives ￿A
￿￿ = 0:0005, which provides
an informal measure of the relative importance of technology shocks. With this proportionality, the
contribution of technology shocks to the total variance of output is less than one percent, as can
be seen in the table by comparing ~ ￿y (the volatility of output in the absence of technology shocks)
with ￿y. The last column reports the case when capital mobility is restricted, ￿ = 0:35; and when
￿A
￿￿ = 0:08. The value of ￿ implies that the marginal cost of shipping capital across borders is about
35% of foreign direct investment. Allowing for such a cost value in capital mobility increases the
relative importance of technology shocks in the model substantially, since it reduces the negative
impact of technology shocks on international comovements and hence the tolerance of technology
shocks in the model. As a consequence, the model￿ s predicted moments can also be brought closer
to the data quantitatively. In this case, the relative standard deviation of technology shocks can
be increased to a value as high as ￿A
￿￿ = 0:1 before the predicted cross-country correlations become
insigni￿cant or negative. However, under this volatility ratio, consumption shocks still explain
more than 80 percent of the variance of the U.S. output. In the extreme case where ￿ = 1, so
that capital is completely immobile, only less than 30% of output variance can be attributed to
technology shocks without causing counter-factual predictions for cross-country correlations. These
results suggest that consumption shocks must play a dominant role in order for the model to explain
the data well. This also explains why Stockman and Tesar (1995) fail to completely resolve the
international comovement puzzles by adding preference shocks, since they allow technology shocks
to play a dominant role in their model.
Overall, regardless of capital mobility and technology shocks, the predictions of the model are
qualitatively consistent with the data, although adding technology shocks and at the same time
restricting capital mobility can improve the model￿ s predictions quantitatively. In particular, the
top panel of Table 2 (last column) shows that the predicted cross-country correlations are positive
for output (y), investment (i), employment (n) and productivity (y=n); and the correlations are
higher for output than for consumption and productivity. These predictions are consistent with
the data (see, e.g., BKK, 1992, 1995). With regard to domestic comovements, the middle panel
shows that productivity, consumption, investment, and employment are all positively correlated
with output, and the net exports-to-output ratio (nx=y) is negatively correlated with output,
as in the data. Consistent with the data, the predicted correlations between domestic saving
rates and investment rates are strongly positive, consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Feldstein
and Horioka (1980). The lower panel shows that predicted domestic output is less volatile than
17investment but more volatile than consumption and the net exports-to-output ratio. Furthermore,
the predicted output is strongly serially correlated (the bottom panel). These predictions are also
consistent with the data (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; and BKK, 1992). The weakest aspect of the
model is perhaps the extremely weak cross-country correlation for consumption. Unless a strong
cross-country correlation of consumption innovations is assumed, the model is not able to match
the data in this aspect.
Intuition. Impulse-response analysis is always useful for understanding the intuitions. In order
to generate trend-reverting impulse responses, I change the AR(1) coe¢ cient of the shocks to 0:95.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of labor productivity, output, consumption, employment,
and investment in the two-country model to a home consumption shock. Several features of the
model are worth noticing. First, productivity increases persistently both at home and abroad,
indicating that demand shocks can generate procyclical productivity not only at home but also
abroad. Second, all variables in the home country are strongly positively correlated with each
other, showing that demand shocks are just as capable of explaining the domestic business cycle
comovements as technology shocks. Third, except consumption, all variables are positively corre-
lated with their counterparts in the foreign country, showing strong international synchronization
of economic activities under the Keynesian ￿demand-pull￿e⁄ect of consumption shocks. This also
implies that the cross-country correlations are higher for output than for consumption. Fourth,
output is hump-shaped both at home and abroad, indicating a richer propagation mechanism in
the model than in standard RBC models (e.g., BKK 1992). This richer propagation mechanism is
mainly attributable to the adjustment costs of employment, which is also crucial for generating the
procyclical productivity.
18Figure 1. Impulse Responses to a Home Consumption Shock.
Under a home-technology shock, on the other hand, productivity, output, employment, and
investment increase in the home country but decrease in the foreign country, indicating negative
cross-country correlations for these variables. In the meantime consumption increases both at
home and abroad, suggesting higher cross-country correlations for consumption than output. These
predictions are inconsistent with the data.21 However, quantitatively speaking, since the data lie
somewhere in between the predictions of consumption shocks and technology shocks, a combination
21To preserve space, the results are not reported here. But they can be found in my working paper (Wen, 2002).
This counter-factual implication of technology shocks indicates that the results obtained by Baxter and Farr (2005)
are not robust. They claim that variable capacity utilization can resolve the international comovements puzzles under
random walk technology shocks. My results show that technology shocks still generate counter-factual predictions
regarding international comovements even with variable capacity utilization and labor hoarding.
19of both shocks can bring the model into closer conformity with the data, especially when frictions
of capital mobility are present so that the strongly negative e⁄ects of home-technology shocks on
foreign investment can be mitigated.
The analysis clearly shows that economic booms/recessions in one country can lead to simulta-
neous booms/recessions in another country when the ￿ uctuations are driven by aggregate demand.
This international transmission of the business cycle under the demand-pull e⁄ect o⁄ers an expla-
nation for the strong economic recovery of the Japanese economy in the last couple of years due
to the strong export demand from China. Thus, the prolonged productivity slowdown and output
stagnation in Japan for the entire 1990s may not necessarily be due to slower technology growth,
but could be due to insu¢ cient aggregate demand after the burst of the Japanese housing bubble
in the early 1990s.
Robustness. As explained previously, in order to generate su¢ ciently smooth consumption and
su¢ ciently volatile and procyclical domestic investment within each country, preference shocks
need to be highly persistent. Under the assumption of random-walk preference shocks, the model
is able to generate su¢ ciently volatile and procyclical investment. However, consumption is still
not smooth enough to match the data. The assumption of habit formation is helpful in reducing
the consumption volatility. Table 3 reports a sensitivity analysis on the model￿ s predictions with
regard to the habit formation parameter, b. Since the e⁄ects of habit formation on international
comovements are minimal, the focus is on the volatility of domestic consumption and investment,
and investment￿ s correlation to GDP (in the absence of technology shocks). Table 3 con￿rms that
the role of habit formation is mainly to reduce the consumption volatility to an empirically plausible
level with regard to the U.S. data. With respect to investment dynamics, habit formation is not
needed.22
Table 3. Sensitivity to Habit Persistence (standard errors in parentheses)￿
b 0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
￿c=￿y 1.37 (0.2) 1.24 (0.2) 1.16 (0.2) 1.00 (0.2) 0.68 (0.1) 0.54 (0.1)
￿i=￿y 2.01 (0.1) 1.98 (0.1) 2.13 (0.1) 2.52 (0.1) 3.47 (0.1) 3.80 (0.1)
￿(i;y) 0.86 (0.0) 0.95 (0.0) 0.97 (0.0) 0.96 (0.0) 0.96 (0.0) 0.96 (0.0)
￿
Note: The predicted statistics are based on 500 simulations with sample length of 100. All series are H-P ￿ltered.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the potential role of demand shocks in explaining the observed international
synchronization of economic activities. It is shown that increases in consumption demand can
stimulate output and productivity domestically, which raises economic activity in other countries
22In the U.S., non-durable goods consumption is always less volatile than output. However, this is not always
the case for some European countries. In this regard, the assumption of habit formation is not even necessary for
explaining consumption in certain European countries.
20as well through net export demand. This demand-side e⁄ect is reminiscent of traditional Keyne-
sian theory, yet without assuming sticky prices (in contrast to the textbook IS-LM models for both
closed and open economies). It is also shown that the observed cross-country synchronizations in
productivity do not have to be explained by assuming highly correlated technology shocks across
borders. Country-speci￿c demand shocks can also explain the procyclical and correlated productiv-
ity movements across nations. This prediction is consistent with the most recent economic revival
of the Japanese economy, which is largely driven by net-exports demand from China.
However, several important issues remain for further investigation. First, in order to overcome
the crowding-out problem, consumption shocks either have to be highly persistent, or there must
exist strong habit formation. Otherwise, domestic investment may be counter-cyclical with respect
to domestic output and consumption may not be smooth enough in the model (see Wen 2002 and
2005 for more detailed analysis). Second, how to measure consumption demand shocks in the
data remains a challenge for any theory that advocates demand shocks as the major driving force
of the business cycle. This problem does not arise in partial equilibrium models studying ￿rms￿
behavior, where consumption demand can be taken as exogenously given. In general equilibrium
models, though, consumption is endogenous, so shocks to consumption demand can only come from
preference changes or changes in consumers￿forecast of the future. Such changes, however, are not
observable. In addition, such aggregate shocks require that there be a coordination device among
individuals. This is di¢ cult to model in a representative-agent framework.23 Lastly, the literature
has documented that the seasonal cycle displays very similar characteristics to that of the business
cycle (e.g., Barsky and Miron, 1989; Miron and Beaulieu, 1996). Since seasonal ￿ uctuations are
primarily driven by consumption spending at Christmas, there is a possibility of a unifying theory
of seasonal and business cycles. This possibility is beyond the scope of the paper and is left for
future investigation.
23See Nakajima (2005) for a di⁄erent approach.
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